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JUDICIAL IMPARTIALITY IN A PARTISAN ERA
Cassandra Burke Robertson?
Abstract
Judicial legitimacy rests on the perception of judicial impartiality. As 
a partisan gulf widens among the American public, however, there is a 
growing skepticism of the judiciary’s neutrality on politically sensitive 
topics. Hardening partisan identities mean that there is less middle ground 
on political issues and less cooperation among those with differing 
political views. As a result, the public increasingly scrutinizes judges and 
judicial candidates for signs of political agreement, distrusting those 
perceived to support the opposing political party. 
Judges themselves are not immune to these political forces. In spite of 
a strong judicial identity that demands impartiality and judicial conduct 
rules that require judges to avoid even the appearance of bias, judges have 
the same unconscious biases and preconceptions as anyone else. 
Moreover, judges must generally have strong political affiliations to 
reach the bench at all, regardless of whether they are elected or appointed. 
Drawing the line between mere political affiliation and an inappropriate 
appearance of partisan bias can therefore be difficult.
This Article analyzes the mechanisms available to safeguard judicial 
impartiality. Although recusal motions are the most common weapon 
against partisan bias, this Article argues that recusal motions cannot 
effectively guard against the appearance of bias arising from a judge’s 
political views. When recusal rules rely on an undefined “appearance” 
standard, they are susceptible to an interpretive bias that undermines their 
purpose. Nonetheless, the Article concludes that the appearance of 
partisan bias in the judicial branch is not so different from other types of 
unconscious bias. As a result, ordinary procedural tools—including the 
right to a jury trial and our system of appellate review—may provide a 
stronger safeguard against judicial bias than recusal motions.
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Public faith in the impartiality of our courts is the bedrock of 
American democracy and the rule of law.1 In an increasingly partisan era, 
however, there is a growing skepticism of the judiciary’s neutrality on 
politically sensitive issues. This skepticism creates difficulties when it 
comes to determining when judges should recuse themselves from 
politically sensitive cases.2 Judicial disqualification rules generally 
require a judge to step aside “whenever a reasonable observer might 
question the judge’s impartiality.”3 But in an era where the public is 
becoming ever more politically polarized, how do we recognize the 
position of a “reasonable observer”?
Two relatively recent cases highlight this dilemma. In the first case, 
federal Judge Shira Sheindlin ruled that New York’s stop-and-frisk 
                                                                                                                     
1. See Nancy J. Moore, Is the Appearance of Impropriety an Appropriate Standard for 
Disciplining Judges in the Twenty-First Century?, 41 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 285, 291 (2010) 
(“Avoiding not only impropriety, but also the appearance of impropriety, is important for judges 
because public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary is 
critical to the public’s willingness to accept judicial decision-making and submit to the rule of 
law.”).
2. Although originally “recusal” referred to a voluntary process and “disqualification” to 
a mandatory process, many jurisdictions use the terms interchangeably. Cases quoted in this 
Article likewise use the two terms as synonyms, and this Article does so as well. See MODEL CODE 
OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.11 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011) (“In many jurisdictions, the term 
‘recusal’ is used interchangeably with the term ‘disqualification.’”); Karen Nelson Moore, 
Appellate Review of Judicial Disqualification Decisions in the Federal Courts, 35 HASTINGS L.J.
829, 830 n.3 (1984) (noting that recusal “technically refers to a voluntary decision of the judge to 
step down”).
3. Debra Lyn Bassett & Rex R. Perschbacher, Perceptions of Justice: An International 
Perspective on Judges and Appearances, 36 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 136, 160 (2013); see MODEL 
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.11 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011).
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policy was unconstitutional.4 The ruling was tremendously controversial 
and became a political touchpoint in the New York political scene. Mayor 
Bloomberg was quoted as saying that he would feel “responsible for a lot 
of people dying” if his administration were forced to implement her 
ruling.5 After her decision was publicized in the newspapers, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stayed her ruling, disqualified 
her from the case, and criticized her actions.6 The Second Circuit’s 
opinion stated that “the appearance of impartiality surrounding this 
litigation was compromised by the District Judge’s improper application 
of the Court’s ‘related case rule,’ and by a series of media interviews and 
public statements purporting to respond publicly to criticism of the 
District Court.”7 In a follow-up opinion, the court stated that although it 
was making “no findings of misconduct, actual bias, or actual partiality 
on the part of Judge Scheindlin,” there were three things the judge had 
done that gave rise to the appearance of partiality: (1) in an earlier lawsuit, 
she had advised the plaintiffs that the relief they sought was not available 
under the settlement agreement they had signed, and that if they wanted 
the requested relief they would need to file a separate lawsuit;8 (2) she 
participated in media interviews and profiles (although she did not speak 
about the pending case);9 and (3) she described herself to media outlets 
as a judge who “is skeptical of law enforcement, in contrast to certain of 
her colleagues, whom she characterizes as inclined to favor the 
government.”10 These three things taken together, the court said, “might 
lead a reasonable observer to question the judge’s impartiality.”11
Observers were sharply split. Certainly, the city’s police 
commissioner agreed with the Second Circuit that there was an 
                                                                                                                     
4. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 627 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Floyd v. City 
of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 668, 671 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Ligon v. City of New York, 925 F. 
Supp. 2d 478, 486 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
5. Benjamin Weiser, Departing Judge Offers Blunt Defense of Ruling in Stop-and-Frisk 
Case, N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/02/nyregion/departing-
judge-offers-blunt-defense-of-ruling-that-ended-stop-and-frisk.html.
6. Ligon v. City of New York, 538 F. App’x 101, 102–03 (2d Cir. 2013), superseded in 
part, 736 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2013), vacated in part, 743 F.3d 362 (2d Cir. 2014), and vacated in 
part, 743 F.3d 362 (2d Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).
7. Id.
8. Ligon v. City of New York, 736 F.3d 118, 124 (2d Cir. 2013) (“And if you got proof of 
inappropriate racial profiling in a good constitutional case, why don’t you bring a lawsuit? You 
can certainly mark it as related. . . . So instead of struggling to telling [sic] me about a stipulation 
of settlement, why don’t you craft a lawsuit?”), vacated in part, 743 F.3d 362 (2d Cir. 2014).
9. Id.
10. Id. at 127.
11. Id.
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appearance of partiality: he stated that “I have always been—and 
certainly I haven’t been alone—concerned about the partiality of Judge 
Scheindlin.”12 But others—including a number of legal ethics professors 
and retired federal judges—concluded that Scheindlin had done nothing 
wrong, and no reasonable person could view her actions as giving rise to 
an appearance of partiality.13 In fact, some concluded, it was the judges 
on the Second Circuit, who were perhaps influenced by an organized 
political backlash to Judge Scheindlin’s ruling, who displayed the 
appearance of bias: “[T]he three judges not only permitted the norms of 
political discourse outside the courthouse to displace the conventional 
norms of the adversarial process and reasoned judicial decision making, 
but also, ironically, failed to satisfy the very standards of judicial conduct 
to which they sought to hold Judge Scheindlin herself.”14
A second case alleging judicial partisan bias arose in the spring of 
2017 in Ohio. A case pending before the Ohio Supreme Court challenged 
the constitutionality of Ohio regulations that required abortion clinics to 
have transfer agreements with a local hospital.15 The case was appealed 
out of Toledo, where the sole remaining abortion provider in northwest 
Ohio had trouble finding a local hospital willing to enter into a transfer 
agreement, but was able to enter an admitting agreement with a hospital 
in Michigan, approximately fifty miles away.16
When the case got to the Ohio Supreme Court, pro-choice groups 
called for Ohio Supreme Court Justice Sharon Kennedy to recuse 
                                                                                                                     
12. Joseph Goldstein, Court Blocks Stop-and-Frisk Changes for New York Police, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 31, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/01/nyregion/court-blocks-stop-and-
frisk-changes-for-new-york-police.html (quoting Police Commissioner Raymond W. Kelly).
13. Bruce A. Green, Legal Discourse and Racial Justice: The Urge to Cry “Bias!,” 28 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 177, 179 (2015) (“One might have been prompted to ask, ‘what's really going on 
here?’”). Anil Kalhan, Stop and Frisk, Judicial Independence, and the Ironies of Improper 
Appearances, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1043, 1127 (2014) (“However, notwithstanding the 
Bloomberg administration’s heated public rhetoric, no reasonable observer could have found any 
basis to question her impartiality or propriety in adjudicating the stop and frisk cases.”). See 
generally Brief of Six Retired U.S. District Court Judges & Thirteen Professors of Legal Ethics 
as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellees’ Motion for Reconsideration by the En Banc 
Court at 14, Ligon v. City of New York, 538 F. App’x 101 (2013) (No. 13-3123) (discussing the 
court’s hasty decision to remove Judge Scheindlin, including the ruling’s inconsistencies with 
current legislation and substantial errors reflected in the findings of the court).
14. Kalhan, supra note 13, at 1127.
15. Capital Care Network of Toledo v. State of Ohio Dep’t of Health, 58 N.E.3d 1207, 1210
(Ohio Ct. App. 2016), appeal allowed sub nom., Capital Care Network of Toledo v. Ohio Dep’t
of Health, 71 N.E.3d 297 (Ohio Ct. App. 2017).
16. Robert Higgs, Ohio to Fight Ruling that State Abortion Regulation Is Unconstitutional,
CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER (Sept. 13, 2016), http://www.cleveland.com/open/index.ssf/2016/09/
ohio_to_fight_ruling_that_stat.html.
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herself.17 She had recently spoken to a Toledo right-to-life group, at a 
time when it was likely that the Ohio Supreme Court would accept the 
case (though it had not yet done so).18 Her speech focused on general 
constitutional and separation-of-powers matters; it “did not discuss or 
refer to any cases pending before the Supreme Court of Ohio, nor did she 
mention abortion and the host group’s positions.”19 However, she was 
believed to be sympathetic to pro-life causes, as she had “filled out a 
judicial candidate survey for Right to Life of Greater Cincinnati, in which 
she affirmed that she agrees with every position espoused by the anti-
abortion organization, including its views on legal and constitutional 
interpretation.”20 No one alleged that she had pre-committed herself to 
the particular issues in the case. In addition, no party to the case filed a 
motion seeking her disqualification.21
When Justice Kennedy declined the call for recusal, an attorney filed 
a grievance over her conduct.22 It was dismissed.23 A second complaint 
was filed, seeking an investigation by the Ohio Supreme Court’s Office 
of Disciplinary Counsel.24 Chief Justice Maureen O’Connor attempted to 
clarify the matter in a public statement, referring to the “unfair criticism 
of Justice Kennedy,” explaining that all judges have a duty to speak to 
the public, and stating that neither the speech nor the justice’s prior 
                                                                                                                     
17. Editorial: Ohio Justice Shouldn’t Hear Abortion Case, COLUMBUS DISPATCH
(Mar. 25, 2017), http://www.dispatch.com/opinion/20170325/editorial-ohio-justice-shouldnt-
hear-abortion-case.
18. Id.
19. Maureen O’Connor, The Judicial Civic Duty to Speak and Explain, SUP. CT. OHIO &
OHIO JUD. SYS. (Mar. 20, 2017), https://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/SCO/justices/oconnor/
news/2017/ judicialCivicDuty.asp.
20. Editorial: Ohio Justice Shouldn’t Hear Abortion Case, supra note 17.
21. Jim Provance, Conflict of Interest Grievance Filed Over Justice’s Talk to Anti-Abortion 
Group, TOLEDO BLADE (Apr. 1, 2017), http://www.toledoblade.com/Courts/2017/04/01/Conflict-
of-interest-grievance-filed-over-justice-Sharon-Kennedy-talk-to-anti-abortion-group.html (“No 
formal motion has been filed by a party in the case asking for Justice Sharon Kennedy to recuse 
herself from the state’s appeal of a ruling blocking enforcement of an order for West Toledo’s 
Capital Care Network to close.”).
22. Jim Provance, Grievance Against Ohio Justice Kennedy Dismissed, TOLEDO BLADE
(June 19, 2017), http://www.toledoblade.com/Politics/2017/06/19/Grievance-dismissed-Ohio-
Supreme-Court-justice-Sharon-Kennedy.html.
23. Id.
24. Second Complaint Lodged Against Ohio Justice Kennedy Over Speech, TOLEDO BLADE
(May 16, 2017), http://www.toledoblade.com/Courts/2017/05/16/Second-complaint-lodged-
against-Ohio-Justice-Sharon-Kennedy-over-speech-at-pro-life-group-fund-raiser.html.
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history of “supporting proposed legislation or advocating for certain 
issues” should disqualify her from hearing the case.25
Even this did little to stem the tide of public criticism, however. One 
newspaper ran an editorial calling on Justice Kennedy to recuse herself, 
concluding that her actions could allow a reasonable person to question 
her impartiality.26 A second newspaper’s editorial board was divided, 
with one editor agreeing that because Justice Kennedy’s speech did not 
touch on abortion issues, it should not be disqualifying, others concerned 
that it at least gave rise to the appearance of partiality, and one who went 
even further, stating that “Justice Kennedy must face up to how recklessly 
ill-conceived is her view that such actions have no impact on the 
credibility of her rulings.”27
The recusal dilemmas facing Judge Scheindlin and Justice Kennedy 
had certain similarities. In both cases, the judges were perceived to have 
certain political pre-commitments that could influence their rulings. In 
Judge Scheindlin’s case, she intended her statement that she was 
“skeptical” of the police in general as a statement of open-mindedness; 
she contrasted her view to the views of some of her colleagues, who she 
believed were “inclined to favor the government.”28 But the statement 
was taken by some as a statement of partiality, not a statement of open-
mindedness. In Justice Kennedy’s case, critics interpreted her willingness 
to speak to a pro-life group and her endorsement by pro-life political 
groups as signs that she would be biased against an abortion provider in 
an upcoming case. Both cases were high-profile and politically charged. 
And in both cases, partisan views on the merits of the cases diverged 
sharply. How could it be unreasonable, then, for an observer to believe 
that the judge’s own partisan identity would threaten her impartiality?
This Article explores the relationship between political partisanship 
and judicial impartiality. Following this introduction, Part II examines 
the growing political divide in the United States. It discusses the 
                                                                                                                     
25. Maureen O’Connor, Unfair Criticism of Justice Kennedy Reflects Poorly on All Judges,
ENQUIRER (Mar. 20, 2017), https://www.cincinnati.com/story/opinion/contributors/2017/03/20/
unfair-criticism-justice-kennedy-reflects-poorly-all-judges/99411996/.
26. Editorial: Ohio Justice Shouldn’t Hear Abortion Case, COLUMBUS ALIVE (Mar. 25, 
2017), http://www.columbusalive.com/opinion/20170325/editorial-ohio-justice-shouldnt-hear-
abortion-case.
27. Did Ohio Supreme Court Justice Sharon Kennedy’s Speech Disqualify Her from Ruling 
on Toledo Abortion Clinic Case? Editorial Board Roundtable, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER
(May 18, 2017), http://www.cleveland.com/opinion/index.ssf/2017/05/justice_sharon_kennedys
_speech.html.
28. Ligon v. City of New York, 736 F.3d 118, 127 (2d Cir. 2013), vacated in part, 743 F.3d 
362 (2d Cir. 2014).
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foundations of partisan identity, looking to social psychology for an 
explanation of the processes by which people define their roles in society 
and in larger social groups. It then applies these processes to the question 
of political identity, examining how differences in partisan identity create 
wide gulfs in the political system.
Part III turns more specifically to the judiciary. First, it examines the 
sometimes-conflicting expectations placed on the judiciary by an 
increasingly polarized public. Next, it turns to judicial identity, looking 
at how judges see themselves and how they reconcile their goal of 
impartiality with the subconscious pressures of partisanship. Part IV then 
considers mechanisms to safeguard judicial impartiality. It concludes that 
recusal motions can play only a limited role in this regard. Although they 
can work well for the most extreme cases of potential bias, they work less 
well when the appearance of bias depends on one’s political views. In 
these cases, the wide divergence in political views means that different 
people will also have widely differing interpretations of judicial conduct. 
Bright-line recusal rules that constrain judicial discretion may work better 
than an open-ended appearance standard in such cases. Ultimately, 
however, this Article concludes that the appearance of partisan bias in the 
judicial branch is not so different from other types of unconscious bias—
and our ordinary procedural mechanisms may be able to compensate for 
unconscious bias better than we realize.
I. A GROWING PARTISAN DIVIDE
In the last twenty years, partisanship has grown stronger in America. 
The divide between the political parties is deeper and more strongly felt 
than it has been in many decades. Research suggests that political parties 
may even be the most polarized they have been in the last 150 years—
since the Civil War.29
This polarization means that there is less and less common ground 
between the two major political parties. The percentage of people 
identifying with each of the two parties overall has not changed greatly 
over the years.30 But what has changed is how closely those people 
                                                                                                                     
29. Mark Strauss, It’s Been 150 Years Since the U.S. Was This Politically Polarized,
GIZMODO (June 12, 2014), http://io9.gizmodo.com/its-been-150-years-since-the-u-s-was-this-
politically-1590076355.
30. Philip Bump, The Growing Myth Of The ‘Independent’ Voter, WASH. POST (Jan. 11, 
2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/01/11/independents-outnumber-
democrats-and-republicans-but-theyre-not-very-independent/?utm_term=.cb86fd9bc43c (noting 
that even though an increasing number of people call themselves “independent,” they still heavily 
favor one of the two main parties).
7
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identify with their political parties, and across how many dimensions—
their “ideological consistency.”31 It used to be more common for people 
to agree with some positions taken by one party and other positions taken 
by the other. In the last two decades, however, the percent of Americans 
holding “consistently conservative” or “consistently liberal” opinions has 
doubled from 10% to 21% on each side.32
This growing polarization means that there is less and less common
ground on issues of public concern. In 1994, for example, there was more 
agreement on environmental protection, with only a “relatively narrow 
10-point partisan gap” on views about environmental regulation.33 By 
2014, that gap had grown to 35 points, with 59% of Republicans—but
only 24% of Democrats—believing that environmental regulations “cost 
too many jobs.”34 The gulf similarly widened as to whether “the 
government today can’t afford to do much more to help the needy,” with 
Republican agreement with that statement growing from 58% in 1994 to 
73% in 2014, and Democratic agreement declining from 37% in 1994 to 
34% in 2014.35 A partisan split has also emerged in people’s views 
towards immigrants, though both sides have grown more favorable 
toward immigration overall: In 1994, 64% of Republicans and 62% of 
Democrats both believed that “immigrants today are a burden on our 
country because they take our jobs, housing, and health care.”36 By 2014, 
neither party had majority agreement with that view.37 But there was an 
emergent split between the parties: 46% of Republicans saw immigration 
as a burden, while only 27% of Democrats agreed.38
A. The Foundations of Partisan Identity
This widening gulf in partisan attitudes is reflected in individuals’ 
partisan identity. Social psychologists who study identity theory have 
explained that people’s self-view incorporates multiple role identities and 
social identities—some of which have an expressly political dimension, 
but many of which do not.39 Role identities show who an individual is in 
                                                                                                                     
31. PEW RESEARCH CTR., POLITICAL POLARIZATION IN THE AMERICAN PUBLIC 6 (June 12,
2014), http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2014/06/6-12-2014-Political-
Polarization-Release.pdf [hereinafter PEW REPORT].
32. Id.






39. PETER J. BURKE & JAN E. STETS, IDENTITY THEORY 113, 118–23 (2009). 
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relation to others in their life—thus, for example, one person may have 
role identities that include mother, attorney, friend, boss, and political 
activist. Social identities encompass the groups an individual belongs 
to—the same person may identify as a Midwesterner, a Catholic, an 
alumnus of the University of Florida Levin College of Law, and a 
Democrat.
Both role identities and social identities are imbued with culturally 
understood meaning, which is called the “identity standard.”40 Thus, the 
identity of “mother” may contain a meaning of nurturing; “boss” may 
contain meanings both of responsibility and of mentoring; 
“Midwesterner” may contain meanings of hard work, authenticity, and 
humility.41 The cultural meanings attached to various identities can be 
similar in some ways to stereotypes, but they are also unconsciously 
assimilated into an individual’s identity structure.42 Thus, when a person 
reflects on her identity as a boss in relation to other employees, she may 
unconsciously also expect herself to take responsibility for the unit’s 
success or failure (the responsibility meaning) as well as responsibility 
for the career development of the workers in her unit (the mentoring 
meaning).
These identity processes can shed some light on political polarization. 
People’s social identities, for example, foster a sense of kinship; people 
are more likely to be favorably disposed to people they recognize as 
sharing one or more social identities.43 For each person, some social 
identities will be more salient than others, and there will be significant 
variation across individuals. Thus, for example, some individuals have a 
                                                                                                                     
40. Id. at 63 (“With respect to gender identity, for example, people may be characterized as 
more masculine or more feminine. Clearly, the character of masculinity and femininity—that is, 
what it means to be male or female—varies from one society to another, and even across 
individuals within a society.”).
41. Id. at 64 (“It is not necessarily one meaning but perhaps several meanings or even a 
very large number of meanings that are contained in the identity standard. . . . For example, as we 
indicated with respect to the college student identity, four different meanings have been found to 
be important: academic ability, intellectualism, sociability, and assertiveness.”); see also Jeffrey 
D. Epstein, 3 Ways a Midwest Mindset Can Build a Better Business, ENTREPENEUR (Aug. 29, 
2017), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/299266 (listing several “Midwestern” attributes);
Linda A. Hill, Becoming the Boss, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan. 2007), 
https://hbr.org/2007/01/becoming-the-boss (explaining the “personal transformation” occurring 
when an individual is promoted to management for the first time).
42. See BURKE & STETS, supra note 39, at 63–64.
43. See Cassandra Burke Robertson, Due Process in the American Identity, 64 ALA. L. REV.
255, 269 (2012) (“Members have categorized themselves on factors they value. . . . As a result, 
group members develop an increasingly favorable perception of the ingroup and a less favorable 
perception of the outgroup.”).
9
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stronger social identity based on statehood,44 racial, ethnic, or religious 
background,45 or political affiliation.46 Individuals engage in cognitive 
framing that reinforces uniformity and enhances group members’ self-
esteem.47
Role identities likewise influence how people see the world. When 
individuals see their role identities confirmed by those around them—as 
when, for example, a person with a strong “student” identity receives an 
A—social psychologists say that the student has achieved “self-
verification.”48 The self-verification process acts to “confirm what 
[people] already believe about themselves.”49 When people see their self-
assessments reflected back at them, they experience positive emotions.50
On the other hand, when people receive feedback at odds with their self-
identity—as when a person with a strong student identity receives a C or 
D—emotional distress results.51 The distress that results from non-self-
verifying feedback is greater than the situation would seem to warrant.52
Thus, for example, the low grade itself may be relatively unimportant, as 
with a grade on a low-stakes assignment likely to have little bearing on 
                                                                                                                     
44. For example, when I moved from the state of Washington to Texas, I found that the 
“Texan” social identity was much more visible and prevalent than a “Washington” identity. 
45. Anthony V. Alfieri & Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Next-Generation Civil Rights Lawyers: 
Race and Representation in the Age of Identity Performance, 122 YALE L.J. 1484, 1527–28 (2013) 
(discussing challenges faced when African-American lawyers share one social identity with 
clients (race) but not another (class)); Holning Lau, An Introduction to Intragroup Dissent and Its 
Legal Implications, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 537, 539 (2014) (“[R]acial, ethnic, and religious groups 
are identity groups because these groups frequently play a role in shaping people’s self-concept. 
To be sure, not all individuals feel a strong sense of membership in racial, ethnic, and religious 
groups, but these groups have been socially constructed in such a way that they are often salient 
to people’s identity.”); Kenneth L. Karst, Myths of Identity: Individual and Group Portraits of 
Race and Sexual Orientation, 43 UCLA L. REV. 263, 283 (1995) (“As the notions of outing and 
passing remind us, a person’s interior sense of his or her own race or sexual orientation may or 
may not be enacted in public. Yet, public or not, each of these identities is social, carrying a 
conventional name that defines someone as a particular kind of person, a member of one of 
society’s categories of identity.”).
46. Cassandra Burke Robertson, Beyond the Torture Memos: Perceptual Filters, Cultural 
Commitments, and Partisan Identity, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 389, 394 (2009) (noting how 
the meanings associated with partisan identity can shift over time).
47. Michael A. Hogg, Social Identity and Misuse of Power: The Dark Side of Leadership,
70 BROOK. L. REV. 1239, 1242 (2005) (“Since the groups and categories we belong to furnish us 
with a social identity that defines and evaluates who we are, we struggle to promote and protect 
the distinctiveness and evaluative positivity of our own group relative to other groups.”).
48. See BURKE & STETS, supra note 39, at 59.
49. Id.
50. Cassandra Burke Robertson, Organizational Management of Conflicting Professional 
Identities, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 603, 607 (2011).
51. Id. at 607–08.
52. Id. at 608.
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the student’s overall grade in the course—but because the low grade 
contradicts the student’s self-conception, it creates an emotional response 
similar to a much larger threat, potentially leading to anger, distress, and 
depression.53
Just as people may engage in unconscious cognitive framing that 
supports their social identity, they may also engage in cognitive strategies 
that avoid facing non-self-verifying feedback.54 These strategies can be 
intentional, such as choosing to spend more time with those who share 
key attributes.55 Such affiliation would increase the opportunities for self-
verification. Cognitive shifts can also happen at an unconscious level, 
where people engage in selective attention or selective interpretation, 
focusing on the information that supports their identity and unconsciously 
ignoring those that do not.56 This process results in a bias blind spot—by 
unconsciously selectively attending to self-verifying feedback and failing 
to notice non-self-verifying feedback, the individual maintains his or her 
self-conception at the cost of failing to perceive important information.57
Political identities are not immune to these forces. Certainly, people 
experience pleasure when their preferred party wins an election and 
distress when their party loses—even for a House seat outside their own 
district that does not affect the overall makeup of Congress.58 And people 
may choose to spend time primarily with those who share similar partisan 
affiliations, creating an identity-reinforcing echo chamber.59 Forming 
such groups does not even require getting together physically, but can 
instead occur in the virtual space of social media or even by watching 
                                                                                                                     
53. Id. at 607–08.
54. Robertson, supra note 46, at 395.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Cassandra Burke Robertson, Judgment, Identity, and Independence, 42 CONN. L. REV.
1, 11 (2009) (“The effects of partisan affiliation, selective perception, and selective interpretation 
can combine to cause people to experience the same events in vastly different ways.”).
58. Molly Ball, Why Ossoff Lost, ATLANTIC (June 21, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/
politics/archive/2017/06/a-crushing-loss-in-georgia-ends-a-losing-season-for-democrats/531072/
(describing the intense emotions engendered by a special election in Georgia for a seat in 
Congress, and noting that “the two candidates had found themselves bit players in a high-stakes 
contest whose stakes, to the audience outside the Sixth District, were almost entirely symbolic. 
Win or lose, either of them would be just one vote in a deadlocked Congress. But what would it 
mean for everyone else?”).
59. Amanda Hess, How to Escape Your Political Bubble for a Clearer View, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/03/arts/the-battle-over-your-political-bubble.
html (“On the internet, the ‘echo chambers’ of old media—the ’90s buzzword for partisan talk 
radio shows and political paperbacks—have been amplified and automated. We no longer need
to channel-surf to Fox News or MSNBC; unseen algorithms on Facebook learn to satisfy our 
existing preferences, so it doesn’t feel like we’re choosing an ideological filter at all.”).
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television channels or listening to radio stations targeted at particular 
segments of society that share a common political identity.60
When political identities are highly salient to an individual, those 
identities may push individuals toward views on particular policy matters 
that can be highly resistant to change. A recent article in the New York 
Times, for example, discussed a group of high-school students in 
Appalachia that strongly identified as conservative.61 Their identity was 
founded on “conservative ideals of hard work, small government and 
what people [in the region] call ‘self-sustainability.’”62 Their families and 
community overwhelmingly supported President Trump in the 2016 
election.63 Because the students had internalized a strong conservative 
identity, they also accepted policy positions associated with that identity, 
including a belief that climate change was not caused by human activity.64
When the students’ science teacher introduced them to information 
contradicting their prior belief, some students reacted emotionally—it
was not just their scientific knowledge that was being challenged, but
their very identity, causing students to feel agitated and angry.65 Some 
students, although initially uncomfortable, were able to accept the 
information they learned without major disruption to their core identity.
For one student, however, the identity threat was too great. When she 
at first objected that the information conflicted with Christian teachings, 
the teacher presented a film by a “Christian climate activist.”66 The 
teacher’s instinct made sense: It is not unreasonable to think that the 
information might be more palatable if conveyed by individuals with 
values shared by the students and a shared social identity of Christianity. 
But the student’s conservative identity was more salient to her, and the 
film felt like an attack on that identity. She became so emotional that she 
ran out of the classroom.67 When explaining her actions later, she framed 
her response in terms of identity, reporting that she felt the film was 
saying “that all these people that I pretty much am like are wrong and 
stupid.”68 To the student, accepting that human activity caused climate 
                                                                                                                     
60. Id.
61. Amy Harmon, Climate Science Meets a Stubborn Obstacle: Students, N.Y. TIMES
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change would threaten both her social identity (“all these people [she is] 
like”) as well as her view of herself as a smart person.69 In the face of 
such cognitive dissonance, she elected to drop the class.70
B. Partisan Identity, Partisan Politics
The student’s distress at hearing information that contradicted her 
political identity exemplifies the personalization of partisanship. On a 
larger scale, increasing political polarization and hardening partisan 
attitudes lead to personal and political rifts. Hardening views mean that 
increasingly people are not just predisposed to think well of others who 
share their social identity, but are also predisposed to feel antipathy 
toward those who do not.71 Researchers have found that “very 
unfavorable” views of the opposing party have more than doubled in the 
last twenty years, so that “45 percent of Democrats and 46 percent of 
Republicans hold ‘very unfavorable’ views of the opposing party.”72
Approximately a third of people in both parties believe that the other 
party’s policies “are so misguided that they threaten the nation’s well-
being.”73
Economics professor Matthew Gentzkow has examined how 
Americans are increasingly polarized, concluding that “what divides 
them politically is increasingly personal . . . . We don’t just disagree 
politely about what is the best way to reform the health care system. We 
believe that those on the other side are trying to destroy America, and that 
we should spare nothing in trying to stop them.”74 Studies examining 
Americans’ attitudes towards members of the opposing political party 
have found that people hold negative personal characterizations of their 
political opponents, believing them to be more close-minded, immoral, 
lazy, dishonest, and less intelligent.75 Fifty years ago, less than 5% of
                                                                                                                     
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. PEW REPORT, supra note 31, at 18.
72. Emily Badger & Niraj Chokshi, How We Became Bitter Political Enemies, N.Y. TIMES
(June 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/15/upshot/how-we-became-bitter-political-
enemies.html.
73. PEW REPORT, supra note 31, at 33 (“Overall, 36% of Republicans and Republican 
leaners say that Democratic policies threaten the nation, while 27% of Democrats and Democratic 
leaners view GOP policies in equally stark terms.”).
74. Matthew Gentzkow, Polarization in 2016, TECH. ACADS. POL’Y (Mar. 18, 2016),
http://www.techpolicy.com/Blog/March-2016/Polarization-in-2016.aspx.
75. Badger & Chokshi, supra note 72 (citing research that “70 percent of Democrats and 
52 percent of Republicans considered members of the opposing party to be more close-minded 
than other Americans. Significant shares also considered opposing partisans exceptionally 
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Americans of both parties said they would be troubled by a son or 
daughter marrying a person from the other party.76 By 2010, “that share 
had jumped to half of Republicans and a third of Democrats.”77
Ultimately, these partisan rifts also create problems for democratic 
legitimacy. This very personal partisan divide does not just separate the 
electorate; it also divides elected officials.78 Voting by members of the 
House of Representatives has gotten significantly more polarized in the 
last fifty years, leading to a lack of cooperation between the two sides.79
Because the number of moderate representatives willing to work across 
party lines has diminished, it has become harder for Congress to pass
legislation, as there is little opportunity for give-and-take.80
The rise of partisan gerrymandering makes the situation even more 
difficult. Districts are drawn with an eye toward maximizing the number 
of seats held by members of the state’s dominant party.81 Districts tend 
not to be closely competitive, and representatives are re-elected more 
than 90% of the time.82 Techniques such as “cracking” (that is, “splitting 
a party’s supporters between districts so they fall shy of a majority in each 
one”) and “packing” (“stuffing remaining supporters in a small number 
of districts that they win handily”) keep the districts from being 
competitive.83 The goal of partisan gerrymandering is to make the 
opposing party “waste” as many votes as possible, either in districts
                                                                                                                     
immoral, lazy and dishonest, though Democrats held those views somewhat less. About a third of 
either party viewed the opposition as less intelligent than other Americans.”).
76. Id.
77. Id.




80. Clio Andris et al., The Rise of Partisanship and Super-Cooperators in the U.S. House 
of Representatives, PLOS ONE (Apr. 21, 2015), http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id
=10.1371/journal.pone.0123507 (“[V]oters cast their ballots on a local basis for increasingly 
partisan representatives  . . . leaving few if any moderate legislators to connect parties for a more 
cohesive Congress. Elected representatives are increasingly unable to cooperate at a national 
Congressional level . . . .”).
81. Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos & Eric M. McGhee, Partisan Gerrymandering and the 
Efficiency Gap, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 831, 850 (2015) (“[T]he goal of a partisan gerrymander is to 
win as many seats as possible given a certain number of votes. To accomplish this aim, a party 
must ensure that its votes translate into seats more ‘efficiently’ than do those of its opponent.”).
82. See Andris et al., supra note 80 (noting that in spite of representatives’ difficulty in 
passing legislation, they are “re-elected at least 90% of the time, reflecting an evasion of collective 
responsibility”).
83. Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 81, at 851.
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crammed full of supporters or in numerous narrowly-lost districts.84
Partisan gerrymandering is, unsurprisingly, controversial because of 
its fundamental inconsistency with democratic governance.85 One of the 
effects of partisan gerrymandering is that politicians need not be 
accountable to their entire electorate.86 In “packed” districts where votes 
overwhelmingly share party affiliation, the elected representative will not 
feel vulnerable (unless perhaps facing a serious primary opponent).87 In 
“cracked” districts, the representative is potentially more vulnerable if the 
prevailing political winds change—but because the district is set up 
intentionally to disenfranchise votes in the minority political party, the 
representative is likely not seeking cross-over votes.88 Instead, winning 
re-election relies on turning out the base.89
It is possible that the Supreme Court will place limits on states’ 
abilities to engage in the practice. The Court has agreed to hear a case 
challenging the constitutionality of partisan gerrymandering in the 2017–
2018 term.90 But even though partisan gerrymandering contributes to the 
nation’s growing polarization, it is not solely responsible for that trend. 
Even in the Senate, where gerrymandering is irrelevant because of 
                                                                                                                     
84. Id.
85. Richard E. Levy, The Nonpartisanship Principle, 25 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 377, 377 
(2016) (“Rules, requirements, or practices whose purpose and effect is to skew the electoral 
process to the advantage of one candidate, faction, or party are fundamentally inconsistent with 
the premise of democratic elections.”).
86. Anthony J. Gaughan, Illiberal Democracy: The Toxic Mix of Fake News, 
Hyperpolarization, and Partisan Election Administration, 12 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y
57, 88 (2017) (“The central idea of democracy is that the voters choose their leaders, not the other 
way around. But when partisans control the redistricting process, incumbent legislators choose 
the voters who are assigned to their districts.”); Levy, supra note 85, at 394 (“[I]t is difficult to 
see why we tolerate a redistricting process that has the avowed purpose and effect of distorting 
electoral outcomes.”).
87. John Finnerty, Momentum May Be Building to End Gerrymandering, HERALD
(June 13, 2017), http://www.sharonherald.com/news/state/momentum-may-be-building-to-end-
gerrymandering/article_00c656e8-bb98-576d-92ad-1b21b9bcc356.html (noting that in 
Pennsylvania in 2016, “86 percent of the state’s races had no primary opponent, and half the 
incumbents had no opposition in the general election”).
88. Sheila Kennedy, It’s All About Turnout (June 22, 2017), 
https://www.sheilakennedy.net/2017/06/its-all-about-turnout/ (“Even supposedly ‘safe’ legislative 
districts can be won by the ‘loser’ party if that party can generate a sufficient increase in 
turnout.”).
89. Id. (“Democrats don’t have to ‘peel off’ Republican voters . . . . We just have to get the 
people who already agree with us to the polls.”).
90. Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 844 (W.D. Wis. 2016), cert granted, Gill v. 
Whitford, No. 16-1161, 2017 WL 1106512, at *1 (June 19, 2017); Amy Howe, Today’s Orders: 
Court to Tackle Partisan Gerrymandering, SCOTUSBLOG (June 19, 2017),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/06/todays-orders-court-tackle-partisan-gerrymandering/.
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statewide elections, partisan attitudes have increased. One-district states 
like Vermont and Wyoming “have seen a similar shift to the extremes.”91
This polarization—aided by gerrymandering, but not caused by it—
results in a situation where elected officials sometimes view themselves 
as representing only those constituents who voted for them, rather than 
representing the entire population of the official’s state or district.92
President Trump reinforced this view when he dismissed the interests of 
Democratic voters at Republican House members’ town hall meetings, 
accusing them of “fill[ing] up our rallies” and asserting that “[t]hey’re not 
the Republican people that the representatives are representing.”93 Efforts 
to require voter identification were similarly targeted at reducing 
democratic voter participation.94
These hardening partisan attitudes and lack of cooperation can even 
lead individuals to believe that actions taken by their political opponents 
lack legitimacy.95 In such cases, not only will elected officials avoid 
working together on policy initiatives, but they may actively try to 
prevent political opponents from even being aware of their own political 
                                                                                                                     
91. Julian E. Zelizer, The Power That Gerrymandering Has Brought to Republicans,
WASH. POST (June 17, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-power-that-
gerrymandering-has-brought-to-republicans/2016/06/17/045264ae-2903-11e6-ae4a-3cdd5fe
74204_story.html?utm_term=.09909e8a7866.
92. See Linda Killian, Ideological Purity Comes Back to Bite the GOP, USA TODAY (Mar.
31, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2017/03/31/ideological-purity-comes-back-
to-bite-republicans-gop-column/99832322/ (stating that “[b]ecause of the lopsided tilt of their 
districts, they need only appeal to a narrow group of voters to get elected . . . .”). 
93. Dara Lind, Donald Trump: Republican Members of Congress Only Represent 
“Republican People” in Their Districts, VOX (Feb. 17, 2017), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-
politics/2017/2/17/14640376/trump-protests-obamacare.
94. Zachary Roth, Ex-Staffer: Wisconsin GOP Intended ID Law to Disenfranchise Dems,
MSNBC (Apr. 7, 2016), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/ex-staffer-wisconsin-gop-intended-id-
law-disenfranchise-dems (quoting an unnamed lawmaker as expressing support for a voter ID law 
in Wisconsin because “[w]hat I’m interested in here is winning, and we need to use the 
opportunity, because if Democrats had the power to do it to us, they’d do it”). In one case, the 
Fourth Circuit found that a voter ID law was intended to reduce minority votes as well as 
Democratic ones. NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 226 (4th Cir. 2016), cert. denied sub nom.
North Carolina v. N.C. State Conference of NAACP, 137 S. Ct. 1399 (2017) (striking down the 
law under the Voting Rights Act and stating that “in what comes as close to a smoking gun as we 
are likely to see in modern times, the State’s very justification for a challenged statute hinges 
explicitly on race—specifically its concern that African Americans, who had overwhelmingly 
voted for Democrats, had too much access to the franchise”).
95. Shanto Iyengar & Sean J. Westwood, Fear and Loathing Across Party Lines: New 
Evidence on Group Polarization, 59 AM. J. POL. SCI. 690, 705 (2014) (“The level of animosity 
across party lines also implies a reduced willingness to treat the actions of partisan opponents as 
legitimate[.]”).
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efforts.96 Thus, for example, Republican Senators kept their work on a 
bill repealing the Affordable Care Act secret until shortly before a vote 
on the bill was scheduled.97 When asked why the details of the proposal 
had been kept secret even from other members of the Senate, a 
Republican political operative replied that “of course, you’re not going to 
go and share [your plans] with the other side.”98
Even criminal investigations have fallen prey to the partisan divide. 
The combination of a strong partisan social identity (which makes people 
predisposed to view their own party’s actions favorably99) combined with 
a growing and personalized division between the two parties (which can 
lead people to distrust others’ motives and doubt the legitimacy of actions 
taken by the opposing party100), can politicize beliefs about wrongdoing. 
Senator Rand Paul recently demonstrated this divide. When asked about 
the possibility of Congressional investigations into Russian interference 
with the 2016 election, he asserted that it makes “no sense” to spend time 
“having Republicans investigate Republicans.”101 At the time of that 
interview, it is unlikely that Paul believed that there was a strong 
likelihood of actual wrongdoing. But the statement is nonetheless 
troubling, both because it shows the possibility of a partisan blind spot 
operating to avoid scrutiny of illegal conduct and, perhaps a greater 
concern, because it suggests that ethical and criminal investigations of 
political opponents may be a legitimate partisan objective—that, in a 
situation raising similar evidentiary red flags, it would be worth 
investigating the opposing party—just not one’s own.102 The Justice 
                                                                                                                     
96. Thomas Kaplan & Robert Pear, Secrecy Surrounding Senate Health Bill Raises Alarms 
in Both Parties, N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/15/us/
politics/secrecy-surrounding-senate-health-bill-raises-alarms-in-both-parties.html (noting that 
“[t]he secrecy surrounding the Senate measure to repeal and replace the Affordable Care Act is 
remarkable” and that it “has created an air of distrust and concern” but that “Senate Republican 
leaders evidently think their back-room approach gives them the best chance to devise a health 
care bill that can squeak through the Senate, given their narrow majority and the policy differences 
in their conference”).
97. MJ Lee et al., Senate GOP Finally Unveils Secret Health Care Bill; Currently Lacks 
Votes to Pass, CNN (June 22, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/06/22/politics/senate-health-care-
bill/index.html.
98. CNN Tonight: The Invisible Tapes Surface; Trump Throws a Piece of Clue (CNN 
television broadcast June 22, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1706/22/cnnt.01.html.
99. See supra Section II.A.
100. See id.
101. Jordain Carney, Rand Paul: Flynn Probe Would Be ‘Excessive,’ HILL (Feb. 14, 2017),
http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/senate/319534-rand-paul-flynn-probe-would-be-excessive.
102. It is worth noting that voters’ support for such an investigation also split along party 
lines: While 62% of Americans expressed support for the investigation, only 28% of “grassroots 
Republicans” did. Dick Polman, Now Republicans Won’t Investigate, FARMINGTON DAILY TIMES
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Department ultimately appointed a special counsel to investigate, but the 
partisan divide in views about that investigation remains strong.103
II. THE PARTISANSHIP THREAT TO JUDICIAL IMPARTIALITY
The growing partisan polarization creates dangers for the judicial 
branch. The appearance of impartiality is critically important to the 
effective functioning of the judiciary. But judges are not immune from 
the political pressures and partisan interests that pervade the political 
branches of government. This Part examines the political expectations 
that people have for the judiciary, as well as judges’ expectations for 
themselves.
A. Political Expectations of the Judiciary
The judiciary faces conflicting expectations from the public. On the 
one hand, the public relies on the judicial branch to safeguard the 
constitutional rights and liberties that are not always protected by the 
political branches of government.104 In order for the court system to play 
this role effectively, judges must maintain their impartiality. And indeed, 
the public generally believes in judicial impartiality—or at least that the 
judiciary is more impartial than other government representatives.105 And 
in large part, this belief is well warranted: Scholars have noted that 
“credible examples” of “judges deciding cases based on responsive or 
                                                                                                                     
(Feb. 16, 2017), http://www.daily-times.com/story/opinion/columnists/2017/02/16/polman-now-
republicans-wont-investigate/98002808/.
103. See Lisa Mascaro, Pro-Trump Group Launches New Attack Ad Against Special Counsel 
Robert Mueller, L.A. TIMES (June 25, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/politics/washington/la-na-
essential-washington-updates-1498343348-htmlstory.html (quoting Republican operative Tomi 
Lahren, saying “[o]nly in Washington could a rigged game like this be called independent”); 
Mallory Shelbourne, GOP Rep Dismisses Mueller Probe: ‘What the Hell Are We Investigating?,’
HILL (June 12, 2017, 8:24 PM), http://thehill.com/homenews/house/337521-gop-rep-on-mueller-
what-the-hell-are-we-investigation (noting that Republican House member Sean Duffy has 
questioned the appointment of Robert Mueller and called the investigation a “charade” that “is 
the Democrats’ effort to undermine the election results of last Nov. 8 and get their net end result, 
which is Donald Trump out of the White House”).
104. Michalyn Steele, Comparative Institutional Competency and Sovereignty in Indian 
Affairs, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 759, 803 (2014) (“Our constitutional scheme is, of course, willing to 
tolerate departures from democratic norms of political accountability to ensure that minority rights 
are protected against majoritarian over-reaching.”); see also W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 
319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943) (“The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects 
from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities . . . .”).
105. See Michael R. Dimino, Pay No Attention to That Man Behind the Robe: Judicial 
Elections, the First Amendment, and Judges as Politicians, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 301, 336 
(2003) (“[A]t a time when the political branches are continually maligned as platforms for long-
winded, small-minded demagogues, respect for the courts continues to persist.”).
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tribal partisanship are notable for their extreme rarity.”106
Particularly in recent years, however, the public often has an 
additional hope for the judiciary: that it will help move forward their 
desired policies.107 Perhaps because the gridlock facing Congress in 
recent years has made it seem like a less likely vehicle for political efforts, 
the future composition of the U.S. Supreme Court was described by 
people on both sides of the political aisle as the “most important” issue 
in the 2016 presidential election.108 As Professor Richard Hasen has 
stated, “with gridlock in the political branches, the Supreme Court’s word 
is often the final word on U.S. policy on questions from health care to 
voting rights.”109
As the country has gotten more polarized, there has been more overt 
discussion of seeking to stack the bench with politically compatible 
judges. Republican senators refused even to grant a hearing to Merrick 
Garland after he was nominated to the Supreme Court by President 
Obama—in spite of the fact that Judge Garland had previously been 
uniformly praised on both sides of the political aisle.110 In an inverse of 
President Roosevelt’s court-packing plan, some even suggested that the 
seat should remain empty indefinitely if a Democratic president was 
elected in 2016.111 After President Trump nominated Justice Gorsuch to 
                                                                                                                     
106. Justin Levitt, The Partisanship Spectrum, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1787, 1832 (2014).
107. See, e.g., Ari Berman, The Supreme Court Is the Most Important Issue in the 2016 
Election, NATION (Feb. 16, 2016), https://www.thenation.com/article/the-supreme-court-is-the-
most-important-issue-in-the-2016-election/ (looking to the Supreme Court for “[h]ealthcare, gay 
marriage, voting rights, affirmative action, reproductive rights, labor rights, immigration, climate 
change”).
108. Id. (“A cliché we hear every presidential cycle is that the Court should be one of the 
most important issues in the election, but this year, following the death of Antonin Scalia, it’s 
never been truer.”).
109. Richard L. Hasen, Why the Most Urgent Civil Rights Cause of Our Time Is the Supreme 
Court Itself, TALKING POINTS MEMO (Sept. 28, 2015), https://talkingpointsmemo.com/cafe/
supreme-court-greatest-civil-rights-cause (“The ideological divide on the Court has now become 
a partisan divide as well. . . . Today all the liberals on the Court have been appointed by 
Democratic presidents and all the conservatives on the Court by Republican presidents.”).
110. Ariane de Vogue, How McConnell Won, and Obama Lost, the Merrick Garland Fight,
CNN (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.cnn.com/2016/11/09/politics/merrick-garland-supreme-
court/index.html.
111. Burgess Everett, Cruz: GOP May Block Supreme Court Nominees Indefinitely,
POLITICO (Oct. 26, 2016), https://www.politico.com/story/2016/10/cruz-supreme-court-blockade-
230363 (quoting Senator Ted Cruz, when asked how the Senate would handle a potential Clinton 
nominee, as stating that “[t]here is certainly long historical precedent for a Supreme Court with 
fewer justices”); Jonathan Swan, Heritage Calling for Supreme Court Blockade If Clinton Wins,
HILL (Nov. 3., 2016), http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/304231-heritage-calling-for-supreme-
court-blockade-if-clinton-wins (“The conservative group Heritage Action is pushing Republican 
19
Robertson: Judicial Impartiality in a Partisan Era
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,
758 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70
the Court, the Senate dropped its supermajority requirement for his 
confirmation vote, allowing the confirmation to proceed on a party-line 
vote.112 Democrats in turn amped up the partisan rhetoric, decrying the 
“stolen” seat.113
The public view of the judiciary is therefore somewhat conflicted.
Although people generally see judges as impartial, they also want judges 
on the bench who share their political views. Somewhat 
counterintuitively, they have greater faith in elected judges rather than in 
appointed ones—the partisan nature of most judicial elections is 
apparently not seen as a threat to impartiality.114 Americans do believe 
“that raising money compromises the integrity of the judiciary,” but also 
believe that “a judge who voices his opinions can be fair and impartial in 
a later case.”115
When judges do demonstrate their impartiality by voting in a way that 
contradicts their partisan affiliation, it can be seen as a betrayal.116 Those 
who believe they share a salient political and social identity with the 
judge and thus expect to also see their beliefs about the case reflected in 
the judge’s ruling feel cognitive dissonance.117 When Chief Justice 
Roberts voted to uphold the Affordable Care Act and Justice Kennedy 
ruled in favor of same-sex marriage, for example, they angered many 
                                                                                                                     
senators to keep the Supreme Court at eight justices if Democrat Hillary Clinton is elected 
president.”).
112. Matt Flegenheimer, Senate Republicans Deploy ‘Nuclear Option’ to Clear Path for 
Gorsuch, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/06/us/politics/neil-
gorsuch-supreme-court-senate.html.
113. Ari Melber & Noel Hartman, Neil Gorsuch Seeking ‘Illegitimate Seat’ on Court, 
Feingold Says, NBC NEWS (Mar. 20, 2017), http://www.nbcnews.com/politics/supreme-
court/feingold-gorsuch-seeks-illegitimate-seat-court-n735541 (“Democrats should filibuster this 
choice, and fight with every fiber of their being, or they will be guilty of letting the Republicans 
get away with stealing a Supreme Court seat.”); Erick Trickey, The History of “Stolen” Supreme 
Court Seats, SMITHSONIAN (Mar. 20, 2017), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/history-
stolen-supreme-court-seats-180962589/ (“Last year, when Senate Republicans refused to vote on 
anyone President Barack Obama nominated to replace the late Justice Antonin Scalia, Democrats 
protested that the GOP was stealing the seat, flouting more than a century of Senate precedent 
about how to treat Supreme Court nominees.”).
114. Dimino, supra note 105, at 336 n.232.
115. Id.
116. Josh Gerstein, Conservatives Steamed at Chief Justice Roberts’ Betrayal, POLITICO
(June 25, 2015), https://www.politico.com/story/2015/06/gop-conservatives-angry-supreme-
court-chief-john-roberts-obamacare-119431 (quoting Curt Levey of the Committee for Justice, “a 
group that presses for conservative judges,” as saying “[t]his affirms that Roberts is something 
very different than what conservatives and probably even liberals thought they were getting. . . . I
would expect people to be bitterly disappointed with Roberts”).
117. See supra Section II.A for a discussion of the tendency to employ cognitive strategies 
in line with identity.
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grassroots conservatives, who saw those votes not just as a political 
disagreement, but as a breach of the rule of law itself.118
B. Judicial Identity and Partisanship 
Judges’ own expectations for the judiciary in some ways mirrors the 
public’s. The ideal of impartiality is a salient—perhaps the most salient—
aspect of the judicial identity.119 Even in the days of Blackstone, the role 
of “judge” was infused with a demand for impartial adjudication that 
owed allegiance to no party but the law.120 Blackstone himself “viewed 
disqualification for personal bias as an unimaginable sign of weakness in 
a judge, whose authority depended on the ability to fairly mete out 
justice.”121
At the same time, however, judges are human—and therefore 
susceptible to the same unconscious biases that afflict us all.122 When a 
judge with a strong role identity is accused of impartiality, we would 
therefore expect the judge to react the same way as any other individual 
                                                                                                                     
118. Gerstein, supra note 116 (“I think he just doesn’t have the courage to follow the law 
when it leads to an uncomfortable place[.]”); Tom Howell Jr., Justices Roberts, Kennedy Fall 
from GOP Favor After Recent Supreme Court Decisions, WASH. TIMES (July 19, 2015), 
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/jul/19/john-roberts-anthony-kennedy-lose-
republican-favor/.
119. Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Disqualification Matters. Again., 30 REV. LITIG.
671, 679 (2011) (“Blackstone’s observation that the judge’s authority “greatly depends” on a 
presumption of impartiality, underscores the centrality of impartiality to the common law judge’s 
self-identity.”).
120. Id.; WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, III COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 361 (1768)
(“[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to 
administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and 
idea.”).
121. John Gibeaut, Show Me the Money: States, ABA Try to Figure Out When Campaign 
Cash Leads to a Judge’s Recusal, A.B.A. J. (Mar. 1, 2012), http://www.abajournal.com/
magazine/article/show_me_the_money_states_aba_try_to_figure_out_when_campaign_cash_ad
ds_up.
122. Michael B. Hyman, Implicit Bias in the Courts, 102 ILL. B.J. 40, 41 (2014) (stating that 
“[n]o one is immune from the influence of implicit bias”); see Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on 
the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 1 (2007) (discussing the effect of 
the human tendency to make snap judgments); see also Tigran W. Eldred, Insights from 
Psychology: Teaching Behavioral Legal Ethics as a Core Element of Professional Responsibility,
2016 MICH. ST. L. REV. 757, 759 (2016) (explaining how law teachers can improve the 
professional responsibility curriculum by including behavioral lessons); Andrew M. Perlman, A
Behavioral Theory of Legal Ethics, 90 IND. L.J. 1639, 1640 (2015) (suggesting that competing 
prescriptions in legal ethics fail to help lawyers avoid unethical conduct because of social 
psychology); Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Jean R. Sternlight, Behavioral Legal Ethics, 45 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 1107, 1113 (2013) (providing suggestions for improving legal ethics).
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who received non-self-verifying feedback.123 That is, we would expect 
some level of emotional distress and a tendency to employ cognitive 
strategies that discount or discredit such feedback.124 Importantly, a judge 
who independently determines that he or she should recuse would not 
likely have such a negative response, because such a decision ratifies his 
or her identity as someone who values impartiality. Receiving a motion 
seeking involuntary disqualification, on the other hand, can feel like a 
threat to the judge’s core judicial identity.
And indeed, observers have noted that judges seem to respond to 
disqualification motions in just this way.125 Professor Charles Geyh has 
explained how a motion to recuse can give rise to an emotional reaction 
from the judge, writing that judges are well aware that ethical rules 
require them to avoid even the appearance of partiality.126 As a result, 
“[b]eing accused of looking bad, when they don’t think they looked bad, 
creates the kind of stress point that makes this issue very, very 
complicated.”127 He finds that judges are therefore “reluctant to concede” 
that they may appear partial when faced with a motion to recuse.128
The late Justice Scalia demonstrated this “stress point,” when asked 
to recuse from a case in which former Vice President Richard Cheney 
was a party.129 Justice Scalia had attended a hunting trip with Cheney 
while the case was ongoing, and a motion had been filed seeking his 
recusal.130 Justice Scalia denied the motion in what was described as “a 
searing, 21-page memo.”131 He expressed anger at the accusation of 
perceived partiality, writing that “[i]f it is reasonable to think that a 
Supreme Court Justice can be bought so cheap, the Nation is in deeper 
trouble than I had imagined.”132
The reality, however, is that even the best judges can never be 
perfectly impartial. In eighteenth century England, Blackstone pointed
                                                                                                                     
123. See supra Section II.B.
124. See supra Section II.B.










132. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for D.C., 541 U.S. 913, 929 (2004) (denying motion to 
recuse).
22
Florida Law Review, Vol. 70, Iss. 4 [], Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol70/iss4/4
2018] JUDICIAL IMPARTIALITY IN A PARTISAN ERA 761
out that judges are “generally selected by the prince or such as enjoy the 
highest offices in the state,” and “in [spite] of their own natural integrity,” 
the judges “will have frequently an involuntary bias towards those of their 
own rank and dignity.”133 This problem was similarly recognized at the 
United States’ founding, when the Antifederalists worried “that judges 
would naturally favor private citizens or organizations that were part of 
the ruling elite.”134
Today, that worry still exists, as judges continue to be 
disproportionately drawn from a privileged socioeconomic 
background.135 But the hardening of political attitudes and partisanship 
raises a new concern: that judges will also be biased because of their 
political affiliations and partisan membership.136
Partisan connections are replete in the judiciary. In a majority of 
states, judges run for election—often on expressly partisan platforms.137
In some states it is not uncommon for litigation to proceed, “from start to 
finish, by state-court judges of a single partisan persuasion who were 
elected in expressly partisan contests.”138 In federal court, where judges 
are appointed for life, the influence of partisan politics is unavoidable; 
“[p]olitics play a role in the composition of the federal courts, in oversight 
of the courts, and in shaping the courts’ jurisdiction.”139
Even the Supreme Court is not immune from the negative effects of 
political polarization. In a recent interview, Justice Elena Kagan 
explained that the Court’s approach to decision-making varies according 
to how controversial the case is.140 The cases less likely to capture public 
attention are easier for the Court to deliberate and discuss, and so are 
                                                                                                                     
133. BLACKSTONE, supra note 120, at 379.
134. Alan Howard Scheiner, Judicial Assessment of Punitive Damages, the Seventh 
Amendment, and the Politics of Jury Power, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 142, 152 (1991).
135. Michele Benedetto Neitz, Socioeconomic Bias in the Judiciary, 61 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
137, 140 (2013) (acknowledging that “[j]udges overwhelmingly come from wealthy backgrounds, 
and many have never walked in the shoes of economically disadvantaged people”).
136. Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, The Long Shadow of Bush v. Gore: Judicial 
Partisanship in Election Cases, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1411, 1418 (2016) (suggesting that partisan 
loyalties may impact the way that judges decide cases).
137. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 790 (2002) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (“39 states currently employ some form of judicial elections for their appellate courts, 
general jurisdiction trial courts, or both.”) (citing AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, JUDICIAL 
SELECTION IN THE STATES: APPELLATE AND GENERAL JURISDICTION COURTS (Apr. 2002)).
138. Levitt, supra note 106, at 1831.
139. Susan Bandes, Judging, Politics, and Accountability: A Reply to Charles Geyh, 56 CASE 
W. RES. L. REV. 947, 956 (2006).
140. Hasen, supra note 109.
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subject to longer discussions at the Court’s conference.141 The more high 
profile and politically significant cases—the “high profile cases that 
appear on the front page of the newspaper”142—actually get less time in 
group deliberation, as “further discussion would just ‘irritate’ colleagues 
and change no one’s minds.”143
Given the psychological forces that act on all of us, it would not be 
surprising for judges’ political identities to result in unconscious biases 
that conflict with their self-conception as impartial decision-makers.144
Identifying the particular occasions when such biases manifest 
themselves, however, is not an easy task. 
Unconscious bias, by its very nature, is not overt. Even when it is 
operating, people can point to other reasons for their conclusions. A study 
of college students studied a “liking bias,” examining whether students 
would be more likely to favor an individual in a hypothetical dispute who 
shared various social and personal characteristics with the subject.145
Unsurprisingly, such a bias was found.146 What was more surprising, 
however, was that when researchers attempted to de-bias the subjects by 
educating them about the possibility of the liking bias and having them 
reflect deeper on their evaluation of the dispute, the students became even 
more set in their first conclusions, believing that they had neutral, 
unbiased reasons for their beliefs.147
Thus, while it is true that “credible examples of these judges deciding 
cases based on responsive or tribal partisanship are notable for their 
extreme rarity,”148 this effect may simply mean that we are unable to 
recognize individual examples.149 While ordinarily “[r]ole norms 
constrain responsive and tribal partisanship” in judging, bias can become 
an issue when those role norms come into conflict with a strongly partisan 
                                                                                                                     
141. Id. 
142. John O. McGinnis, Our Two Supreme Courts, LIBR. L. & LIBERTY (May 6, 2015),
http://www.libertylawsite.org/2015/05/06/our-two-supreme-courts/.
143. Hasen, supra note 109.
144. Brannon P. Denning, The Case Against Appointing Politicians to the Supreme Court,
64 FLA. L. REV. F. 31, 32 (2012) (“[I]t might be difficult for a politician cum Justice to shed party 
attachments even after donning her robes.”).
145. Cynthia McPherson Frantz, I AM Being Fair: The Bias Blind Spot as a Stumbling Block 
to Seeing Both Sides, 28 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 157, 166 (2006).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Levitt, supra note 106, at 1832.
149. Melinda A. Marbes, Reshaping Recusal Procedures: Eliminating Decisionmaker Bias 
and Promoting Public Confidence, 49 VAL. U. L. REV. 807, 865 (2015) (hypothesizing that the 
social science research would likely carry over into the judicial context as well).
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social identity.150
Biases operate at an unconscious level and there are always other 
plausible explanations for any particular ruling.151 And political bias is 
especially hard to pin down; at some level, “[p]olitics, ideologies, and 
theories of governance and interpretation shade into one another.”152
What we can say, however, is that there are patterns of biased judicial 
decision-making in a number of contexts. Scholars have found that when 
judges were able to override jury decisions on the death penalty, elected 
judges were more likely to do so than appointed ones.153 Even for 
appointed judges, scholars have found that “the probability that a capital 
verdict will be reversed on final federal review seems to be related to
whether review is by judges mainly appointed by Republican presidents 
or by judges mainly appointed by Democratic presidents.”154
Likewise, research has found that judicial decisions tend to align with 
judges’ “retention incentives.”155 Regardless of whether the judges were 
elected or appointed, their rulings “appear to behave roughly the same in 
terms of partisan favoritism that would cater to their party audience.”156
Recent empirical work took the research a step further, investigating 
whether a partisan bias could be found when examining judicial rulings 
                                                                                                                     
150. Levitt, supra note 106, at 1867; see also Robertson, supra note 46, at 394 (discussing 
that “a person’s political identity will affect not just his or her opinions about relevant policy 
choices: it will also affect his or her perception of the facts underlying those policy choices”).
151. Antony Page, Unconscious Bias and the Limits of Director Independence, 2009 U. ILL.
L. REV. 237, 282 (“Frequently (and inevitably), we are ignorant of the mental processes that led 
to a particular result. There is, however, ample evidence that factors we either cannot or will not 
recognize affect the decisions we reach.”).
152. Bandes, supra note 139, at 950.
153. Id. at 951; Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death: 
Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REV. 759, 
793–94 (1995).
154. Bandes, supra note 139, at 958 (quoting JAMES S. LIEBMAN ET AL., A BROKEN SYSTEM,
PART II: WHY THERE IS SO MUCH ERROR IN CAPITAL CASES, AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT
398 (2002)).
155. Kang & Shepherd, supra note 136, at 1444; see also Eric Helland & Alexander 
Tabarrok, The Effect of Electoral Institutions on Tort Awards, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 341, 342 
(2002) [hereinafter Helland & Tabarrok, Electoral Institutions] (testing the “partisan election 
hypothesis” to see if elected judges “have an incentive to grant larger awards than other judges”);
Joanna M. Shepherd, The Influence of Retention Politics on Judges’ Voting, 38 J. LEGAL STUD.
169, 171 (2009) (stating “that the voting of state supreme court judges is strongly associated with 
the stereotypical preferences of the retention agents”); Alexander Tabarrok & Eric Helland, Court 
Politics: The Political Economy of Tort Awards, 42 J.L. & ECON. 157, 158 (1999) [hereinafter 
Tabarrok & Helland, Court Politics] (arguing that “elected judges face different incentives and 
can be predicted to behave differently than nonelected judges”).
156. Kang & Shepherd, supra note 136, at 1444.
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in local election litigation.157 Not only did the researchers find such a 
connection, but they also found that it did not hold true “for lame duck 
incumbents who are vacating their seats,” thus suggesting that judicial 
selection alone could “not fully explain the relationship between 
campaign contributions and partisan loyalty in these cases.”158
III. SAFEGUARDING IMPARTIALITY
All of these contradicting principles come into play in responding to 
calls for recusal in particular cases. The public largely believes that 
judges can remain impartial, and expects them to do so—but in politically 
sensitive cases people also believe that impartiality means aligning with 
their own policy choices.159 The concept of impartiality is a very strong 
part of the judicial identity, but that identity does not always shield judges 
from ruling in ways that favor their social, political, and economic 
interests.160 Counterintuitively, the fact that impartiality is integrated so 
tightly into the judicial identity can actually make it harder for judges to 
recognize their own unconscious biases.161
Under these circumstances, how can the legal profession best protect 
judicial impartiality in an era of entrenched partisanship? This Part
examines the strengths and weaknesses of several options, including 
(1) contesting the appearance of partiality through recusal motions; (2) 
placing additional restrictions on judicial discretion by adding more 
bright-line rules for disqualification, and (3) relying on procedural 
safeguards to promote impartiality.
A. Contesting the Appearance of Partiality
Both state and federal judges are typically governed by standards 
requiring them not just to rule impartially, but also to maintain the 
appearance of impartiality. Federal judges are governed by 28 U.S.C. 
§ 455, which provides that a judge “shall disqualify himself in any 
proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”162
Most state court judges are governed by state codes that mirror the ABA’s 
Model Code of Judicial Conduct, which likewise provides that “[a] judge 
                                                                                                                     
157. Id. at 1446.
158. Id. at 1447.
159. See supra Section II.A.
160. See supra Section II.B.
161. See supra Section II.B.
162. 28 U.S.C. § 455; see also Debra Lyn Bassett, Judicial Disqualification in the Federal 
Appellate Courts, 87 IOWA L. REV. 1213, 1230 (2002) (noting that the Code of Conduct for U.S. 
Judges has similar language).
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shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge’s 
impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”163 The Model Code also 
gives a number of specific instances in which appearances require the 
judge’s disqualification: including, for example, situations where the 
judge has a financial interest in the case, where the judge has made 
statements that appear to commit the judge to reach a particular result in 
future cases, or where the judge’s spouse or child is acting as a lawyer for 
a party in the case.164
The Model Code defines impartiality as the “absence of bias or 
prejudice in favor of, or against, particular parties or classes of parties, as 
well as maintenance of an open mind in considering issues that may come 
before a judge.”165 In spite of the breadth of this definition, not all 
preconceptions are disqualifying. The Supreme Court has interpreted the 
words “bias” and “prejudice” under § 455 to “connote a favorable or 
unfavorable disposition or opinion that is somehow wrongful or
inappropriate, either because it is undeserved, or because it rests upon 
knowledge that the subject ought not to possess . . . or because it is 
excessive in degree.”166
Judges are responsible for voluntarily stepping aside when they are 
disqualified under these provisions.167 Litigants can also file motions 
seeking to recuse a judge. In most jurisdictions, the challenged judge will 
hear and rule on the motions themselves—a practice that has been subject 
to much criticism.168 There is typically no formal opinion issued when a 
motion is denied, as approximately 90% are.169
A judge who determines that the grounds for recusal have not been 
                                                                                                                     
163. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.11 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011).
164. Id. (providing a list of fourteen specific instances that will require judicial 
disqualification).
165. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Terminology (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011).
166. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 550 (1994).
167. Numerous observers recommend having someone other than the challenged judge 
decide the recusal motion, noting that due to the nature of unconscious bias, bias blind spot, and 
the “public position” effect, “the challenged judge typically will not be aware of their effect on 
his or her decision-making process.” Debra Lyn Bassett, Three Reasons Why the Challenged 
Judge Should Not Rule on a Judicial Recusal Motion, 18 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 659, 660 
(2015); see also Geyh, supra note 119, at 695, 708 (concluding that allowing a judge to rule on 
his or her own recusal motion relies on “two implicit assumptions: that judges are able to assess 
the extent of their own bias; and that judges are able to assess how others reasonably perceive 
their conduct” and pointing out that “[n]either assumption is safe”).
168. Id. at 729 (“Assigning disqualification motions to a different judge will avoid self-
interested judges ‘grading their own papers’ but may not overcome the ambivalence judges feel 
about questioning the impartiality of colleagues.”).
169. Gibeaut, supra note 121.
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met should deny the motion and hear the case, however. As a well-
regarded treatise has summarized, “a federal judge still has a duty to sit 
unless there are grounds for recusal.  . . . A federal judge has never been 
permitted to recuse because a case would impose personal burdens or 
because he would rather handle some other kind of case, and § 455(a) 
certainly does not provide such license.”170
Appellate courts can review a judge’s failure to step aside. In the last 
ten years, the Supreme Court has twice held that a judge’s failure to do 
so resulted in a violation of the litigant’s due process rights. First, in 
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.,171 the Court held that an elected judge 
whose campaign was funded in large part by a single donor (the CEO of 
a mining company) could not constitutionally adjudicate a case in which 
that company was a party.172 The Court noted that a subjective belief in 
impartiality was not enough; instead, it applied an objective test to 
determine whether recusal was necessary, finding “a serious risk of actual 
bias—based on objective and reasonable perceptions—when a person 
with a personal stake in a particular case had a significant and 
disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the case by raising 
funds or directing the judge’s election campaign when the case was 
pending or imminent.”173 Given the importance of the very large 
contribution to the justice’s campaign, the Court found that due process 
required recusal.174
More recently, the Supreme Court issued an opinion in Williams v. 
Pennsylvania,175 a case in which an elected district attorney sought the 
death penalty against a defendant, was then elected to the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court many years later, and in that capacity voted with the court 
to deny habeas relief in a later proceeding by that same defendant.176 The 
Court reversed the judgment of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, holding 
that “under the Due Process Clause there is an impermissible risk of 
actual bias when a judge earlier had significant, personal involvement as 
a prosecutor in a critical decision regarding the defendant’s case.”177 In 
determining that the risk of actual bias was unacceptably high, the Court 
                                                                                                                     
170. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3549 (3d ed. 
2008).
171. 556 U.S. 868 (2009).
172. Id. at 884.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 886.
175. 136 S. Ct. 1899 (2016).
176. Id. at 1905.
177. Id.
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referenced the concept of unconscious bias, noting that “a risk that the 
judge ‘would be so psychologically wedded’ to his or her previous 
position as a prosecutor that the judge ‘would consciously or 
unconsciously avoid the appearance of having erred or changed 
position.’”178 The Court also emphasized the importance of the 
appearance, as well as the actuality, of impartial adjudication: “An 
insistence on the appearance of neutrality is not some artificial attempt to 
mask imperfection in the judicial process, but rather an essential means 
of ensuring the reality of a fair adjudication. Both the appearance and 
reality of impartial justice are necessary to the public legitimacy of 
judicial pronouncements and thus to the rule of law itself.”179
Given the broad standard of the judicial conduct rules (requiring 
disqualification when a judge’s impartiality “might reasonably be 
questioned”) along with the Supreme Court’s emphasis on the appearance 
of impartiality, it might seem that motions to recuse based on political 
pre-commitments and partisan affiliation would be on strong ground. 
Indeed, commentators have called on parties to more often seek recusal 
on these bases.180 But scholars have found that such recusal motions are 
effective only when “[t]he sources of bias are objectively identifiable, and 
other judges who do not suffer from the same bias may be found.”181
When the bias at issue is a political worldview or ideology, such 
objective identification may be difficult or impossible. As noted above, 
politics cannot be effectively separated from other underlying ideology, 
theories of governance, or even legal interpretation.182 Knowing that a 
judge views herself as an originalist, for example, can allow an observer 
to make reasonable (though not perfect) predictions about how that judge 
will rule in constitutional cases—and on balance, such rulings are 
associated with one political party more than the other. Likewise, 
knowing that a judge was appointed by a Republican or a Democratic 
president makes it somewhat easier to predict the judge’s rulings, though 
also with highly imperfect accuracy. Hindsight bias, of course, can make 
such predictive accuracy appear stronger (“Of course the judge ruled that 
                                                                                                                     
178. Id. at 1906.
179. Id. at 1909.
180. See Keith Swisher, Pro-Prosecution Judges: “Tough on Crime,” Soft on Strategy, Ripe 
for Disqualification, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 317, 319 (2010) (“[T]his Article advances the following, 
slightly scandalous claim: particularly in our post-Caperton, political-realist world, tough-on-
crime elective judges should recuse themselves from all criminal cases.”).
181. Dmitry Bam, Recusal Failure, 18 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 631, 656 (2015).
182. See Bandes, supra note 139, at 950; see also Page, supra note 151, at 281 (discussing 
that “people do not necessarily know why they have reached a particular decision”).
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way!”), but there are enough examples of judges ruling contrary to 
expectations that no prediction can be guaranteed.
Even when judges do rule in accordance with their perceived political 
leanings, it does not mean that the judge is beholden to party interests. 
Instead, such a ruling may simply reflect either the thoroughness of the 
vetting process prior to the judge’s appointment, or a high level of 
concordance between the judge’s views and the views of a majority of 
the electorate. In either case, the judge’s personal views (such as being 
“skeptical of the police,” or holding religious objections to abortion) may 
have figured in to the judge’s ascendance to the bench.183 In both cases, 
a reasonable observer may believe that the judge’s view and political 
identity would cause her to unconsciously sympathize with certain 
parties. In neither case, however, are there specific facts that would lead 
a reasonable observer to conclude that the judge could not set aside that 
sympathy. The Supreme Court has, after all, specified that disqualifying 
bias would likely either rest upon appearance of “knowledge that the 
[judge] ought not to possess” or a sympathy that is “excessive in 
degree.”184 Courts have furthermore held that the “recusal statute should 
not be construed so broadly as to become presumptive or to require 
recusal based on unsubstantiated suggestions of personal bias or 
prejudice.”185
The question, of course, is how do you define the appearance of bias 
that is “excessive in degree”—and what kind of evidence is necessary to 
substantiate it? The majority view appears to be that one’s worldview and 
social identities do not indicate disqualifying bias. Courts have therefore 
held that an Episcopalian judge could hear a case in which an Episcopal 
diocese is a litigant,186 a judge whose wife was a litigation director for the 
ACLU could hear a same-sex marriage challenge even though the ACLU 
had filed amicus briefs in other same-sex marriage cases,187 and a judge 
who had sponsored death-penalty legislation in his earlier career as a 
legislator could oversee prosecutions brought under that law.188
Thus, as one legal scholar has noted, the recusal process is not 
particularly effective in cases of alleged partisan bias.189 The appearance 
                                                                                                                     
183. See supra Part I.
184. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 550 (1994).
185. Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colo., 289 F.3d 648, 659–60 (10th 
Cir. 2002).
186. Id. at 659.
187. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 630 F.3d 909, 916 (9th Cir. 2011).
188. Buell v. Mitchell, 274 F.3d 337, 347 (6th Cir. 2001).
189. Green, supra note 13, at 201.
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of impartiality, after all, is in the eye of the “reasonable” beholder—and 
as the public grows more partisan, views of judicial conduct will likewise 
split along party lines.190 We see this in response to the two situations set 
out in the introduction.191 To law-and-order conservatives, it seemed 
obvious that Judge Scheindlin’s actions gave rise to an appearance of 
partiality. To liberals, it appeared obvious that Ohio’s Justice Kennedy 
did. But neither view was widely shared by those with the opposite 
political identity. When the public is so polarized, it becomes extremely 
difficult to identify the view of a “reasonable” person.
At its worst, the process may actually be counterproductive: “Given 
the judicial norm of impartiality, an accusation of bias, if taken seriously, 
will weaken public respect for, and undermine the legitimacy of, the 
opinion.”192 In a few situations, such as the Williams and Caperton cases 
described above, the facts may be so dramatic that it is not difficult to say 
that the appearance of bias is either suggestive of improper connections 
to the case (as in Williams) or of partiality based on extraordinary 
circumstances (as in Caperton). In those cases, recusal is critically 
important not just to protect the appearance of justice, but also to protect 
fundamental due process. But in the general case of unconscious partisan 
bias, recusal motions are unlikely to solve the problem. If we rely on them 
as the primary vehicle to address the possibility of partisan bias, then we 
run the risk that nearly half the country will not just be disappointed in 
the recusal ruling (whether granted or not), but will actually lose respect 
for the legitimacy of the court.
B. Curbing Discretion
If recusal alone cannot solve the problem of perceived partisan bias in 
the judiciary, then what else could be done? Some have suggested curbing 
judicial speech in order to reduce the appearance of bias. However, such 
curbs hamper the public’s ability to meaningfully contribute to judicial 
selection efforts, whether by direct election or otherwise.193 As a result, 
the Supreme Court has held that such restrictions must be judged by strict 
                                                                                                                     
190. See supra Section II.B.
191. See supra Part I.
192. Green, supra note 13, at 201.
193. Stephen Gillers, “If Elected, I Promise [________]”—What Should Judicial 
Candidates Be Allowed to Say?, 35 IND. L. REV. 725, 725 (2002) (“[A] popular election means 
that voters will pick judges. In making those choices, they need information. . . . We cannot give 
voters the job of picking judges and then deny them the kind of detail that a responsible person 
would want to have to fulfill the assignment conscientiously.”).
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scrutiny, a standard that few restrictions on speech can survive.194
A more fruitful possibility is to expand the use of bright-line recusal 
rules that do not require the exercise of discretion. The ABA Model Code 
of Judicial Conduct, for example, contains fourteen situations in which 
the appearance of bias is presumed—cases where, for example, the judge 
has a financial interest in the case or where the judge’s spouse is a lawyer 
or a party.195
Additional grounds for non-discretionary disqualification—especially 
grounds tied to strong partisan activity—could be adopted. This type of 
rule “may prevent the biased judge from taking personal offense to a 
recusal motion, or can make recusal motions unnecessary since the 
grounds for recusal are objectively identifiable to any reasonable 
jurist.”196 For example, the ABA has recommended adding a hard-cap 
dollar amount at which a litigant’s campaign contributions will disqualify 
a judge.197 Few states have accepted such a rule at this point.198 Two of 
the larger states that have are New York, which set an automatic recusal 
amount of $3,500, and California, which requires recusal for 
contributions over $1,500.199
One of the concerns raised by the contributor automatic-
disqualification rule is that it could allow for strategic disqualification—
that is, a law firm or lawyer could make a donation solely with the intent 
of disqualifying a judge.200 Setting a high enough dollar amount and 
forbidding donations from parties or firms with pending cases could help 
ameliorate that problem.  
                                                                                                                     
194. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 792 (2002) (“[T]he State has 
voluntarily taken on the risks to judicial bias described above. As a result, the State’s claim that 
it needs to significantly restrict judges’ speech in order to protect judicial impartiality is 
particularly troubling. If the State has a problem with judicial impartiality, it is largely one the 
State brought upon itself by continuing the practice of popularly electing judges.”).
195. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.11 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011).
196. Bam, supra note 181, at 656–57.
197. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.11(A)(4) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011) (proposing 
that states require disqualification when “[t]he judge knows or learns by means of a timely motion
that a party, a party’s lawyer, or the law firm of a party’s lawyer has within the previous [insert 
number] year[s] made aggregate* contributions* to the judge’s campaign in an amount that [is 
greater than $[insert amount] for an individual or $[insert amount] for an entity] [is reasonable 
and appropriate for an individual or an entity]”).
198. Gibeaut, supra note 121.
199. Id.
200. Id. (“Artificially low limits may encourage lawyers to forum-shop merely by making 
contributions over the threshold amount to judges they’d rather not face. The existing ABA model
also only limits contributions to a judge’s campaign, and not independent expenditures of the sort 
that arose in Caperton and again in Citizens United.”).
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In addition, a second reform—allowing one “peremptory” challenge 
of a judge—could also help forestall such gamesmanship.201 Eighteen 
states now have some form of peremptory disqualification, including 
large states such as Texas and California.202 As Professor Geyh has
stated, peremptory recusal statutes allow a party to “have one crack at the 
judge and can remove him automatically without having to get in the 
judge’s grill and say, ‘you’re as partial as the day is long.’”203 The 
remaining states and the federal system should consider adopting such a 
process.
This procedure may be especially important in protecting against the 
appearance of partisan bias, because it neither requires substantiation of 
bias nor threatens the judge’s self-conception of impartiality.204 And if
both sides are given a single strike, parties would have to choose 
carefully: Every judge comes to the bench with his or her own worldview. 
Is this particular judge worth using the party’s single strike on? Because 
both parties get a single strike, chances are strong that the judge who 
hears the case will be perceived as, if not entirely unbiased, at least 
legitimate by both parties.
Law professor Milan Markovic has suggested a similar prophylactic 
recusal rule for nationality-based challenges to judges in international 
criminal tribunals who are asked to rule on crimes committed by or 
against persons in the judge’s home nation.205 Markovic notes that it is 
likewise difficult to discern the presence of nationality-based bias in 
specific judges or particular cases, as “[t]here are no reliable indicia of a 
judge’s identification with his or her national polity or whether he or she 
is under conscious or subconscious pressure to rule in a particular 
                                                                                                                     
201. RICHARD E. FLAMM, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION OF
JUDGES 753–54 (2d ed. 2007).
202. Id. at 753 (“Whereas in a majority of jurisdictions judges may only be removed for 
cause, a substantial minority of states have adopted statutes or court rules that permit a party to 
seek judicial disqualification on a peremptory basis.”); Bassett, supra note 167, at 679 
(“[E]ighteen state judiciaries, including California, Texas, and Indiana, employ a peremptory-
disqualification procedure, some federal case law has recognized a discretionary transfer of a 
judicial disqualification motion to another judge, and some state courts require the transfer of such 
motions.”).
203. Geyh, supra note 126, at 539; ABA Judicial Disqualification Project, Taking 
Disqualification Seriously, 92 JUDICATURE 12, 15 n.39 (2008) (“States that permit peremptory 
challenges of at least some judges are: Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, 
Indiana, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, South 
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204. FLAMM, supra note 201, at 753–54.
205. Milan Markovic, International Criminal Trials and the Disqualification of Judges on 
the Basis of Nationality, 13 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 1, 47 (2014).
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manner.”206 Nevertheless, he concludes that because “national bias is 
likely to be more prevalent and significant” when the judge shares a 
national identity with either the alleged perpetrator or the victims, the 
international tribunals “should not place judges in the position of having 
to represent the international community in cases involving crimes 
allegedly committed by or against their fellow nationals.”207
These same concerns operate nationally when partisan bias is at issue.  
Stronger mandatory disqualification rules, combined with a single 
peremptory strike, could ameliorate the perception of political bias in the 
judiciary. These rules would probably not be invoked in a large number 
of cases, but they would not need to be. The important thing is that they 
could provide a remedy in the few cases that cause the highest risk of 
distrust in the judicial system.
C. Protecting the Procedural Safeguards of Impartiality
Perhaps the most important protection of an impartial judiciary is our 
procedural system itself. The founders of our tripartite democratic system 
realized that perfect impartiality was an impossible goal. As long as 
judges are human, they will be subject to the same unconscious biases 
and blind spots that affect us all. As Professor Geyh has noted, what 
matters is that “judges are ‘impartial enough’ to fulfill the role assigned 
them under state and federal constitutions: to uphold the rule of law.”208
Given this reality, the founders created procedural safeguards within the 
American judicial system to counter ordinary levels of partisan bias.
For the founders, the most important mechanism to curb judicial bias 
was the jury.209 The Antifederalists, concerned that “judges would 
naturally favor private citizens or organizations that were part of the 
ruling elite,” believed that the civil jury “would serve as a bulwark against 
private as well as public oppression.”210 Alexander Hamilton likewise 
wrote that juries could offer a “security against corruption.”211 Although 
jurors, as well as judges, could suffer from bias, Hamilton believed that 
both judge and jury could be a check on each other. He concluded that 
there would be “double security,” because the judge could grant a new 
                                                                                                                     
206. Id. at 46–47.
207. Id. at 47–48.
208. Charles Gardner Geyh, The Dimensions of Judicial Impartiality, 65 FLA. L. REV. 493, 
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210. Scheiner, supra note 134, at 152.
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trial “where the jury has gone evidently wrong,”212 and the jury could 
protect against the “temptations to prostitution which the judges might 
have to surmount.”213
Today, that jury process is used much more rarely than it was at the 
time of the founding.214 But if the jury process is endangered, it is still 
not yet dead. In addition to its adjudication role, the mere presence of a 
jury can also serve “a watch-dog function,” encouraging judges to 
consider a diversity of viewpoints.215 Lawyers, judges, and others who 
care about the functioning of the judicial system should work hard to 
ensure that juries continue to offer a check on judicial decision-making.
An even though the jury may have declined in use, another procedural 
safeguard—a robust appellate system—has become a fundamental 
cornerstone of the judicial system over the last century.216 Appellate 
review helps to minimize the effects of a single judge’s bias. Appellate 
review does not guarantee bias correction,217 but evidence suggests that 
the old adage “more heads are better than one,” holds some truth. Group 
decision-making tends, at least on average, to lead to less biased 
outcomes.218 Between the process of deliberation, the law of averages 
smoothing out the risk of individual bias, and the multiple points of view 
on a panel of judges, a multi-member court is less likely to give rise to a 
biased judgment.219
Focusing on appellate law as a bias-correction mechanism also has a 
separate advantage: it ensures the standardization of legal doctrine, 
allowing that doctrine to be applied without regard to an individual 
judge’s predilections. In this way, appellate review resembles the 
discretion-curbing mechanisms described above.220 Thus, while judicial 
discussions of personal bias can tend to polarize opinion and risk 
undermining judicial legitimacy, discussions of doctrine generally do not 
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run this risk.221 The removal of Judge Scheindlin from the stop-and-frisk 
case, for example, was highly controversial, with accusations of judicial 
bias on both sides.222 The constitutional doctrine itself, while still 
politically charged, did not lead to the same vitriol against members of 
the judiciary. Ultimately, the issue was settled (at least for the time being) 
by a combination of judicial involvement and political decision-making: 
After the policy was ruled unconstitutional, a new political administration 
was elected and chose to drop the appeal.223
CONCLUSION
The perception of judicial impartiality is essential to a belief in judicial 
legitimacy. In the current era, however, the public’s deepening political 
divide threatens the perception of judicial neutrality. Hardening partisan 
identities mean that there is less middle ground on political issues and 
less cooperation among those with differing political views. As a result, 
the public increasingly scrutinizes judges and judicial candidates for 
signs of political agreement—and for signs of political opposition. 
That scrutiny often raises questions about judges’ political 
commitments. Judges must generally have strong political affiliations to 
reach the bench at all, regardless of whether they are elected or appointed 
Furthermore, in spite of a strong judicial identity that demands 
impartiality, judges have the same unconscious biases and 
preconceptions as anyone else. 
But trying to use disqualification motions to address such bias is 
problematic. First, it is often impossible to separate partisan bias from 
ordinary political worldview, ideology, or theories of governance. 
Second, the appearance of impartiality depends very much on the 
political views of the observer—and with a growing partisan schism 
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throughout the country, there is no single perspective that can be 
attributed to a so-called “reasonable observer.”224 Finally, the deepening 
political divide means that a large fraction of the population will always 
be dissatisfied with the ruling on a disqualification motion alleging 
political bias. That dissatisfaction risks growing into a more generalized 
distrust of the court’s ruling, undermining the very purpose of the recusal 
rules.
Luckily, disqualification need not be the first line of defense against 
political polarization. The procedural safeguards of our justice system are 
robust enough to adapt to an increasingly polarized nation. Certainly, 
there is a role for recusal motions, as they can effectively counter the most 
extreme cases of potential bias. When political views diverge, however, 
our ordinary procedural tools—including the right to a jury trial and our 
system of appellate review—may better protect the integrity of the
judicial system than mandatory disqualification.
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